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Abstract
A simple probit model of property rights adoption is estimated for U.S. fisheries managed
under the Magnuson Act. The results of the model are consistent with the literature on
property rights and transaction costs: Namely, the adoption of private property rights to
marine fisheries is shown to hinge on the value of variables which determine, on the one
hand, the costs of monitoring and enforcing rights, and on the other hand, the benefits of
more clearly defining such rights.
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Received wisdom suggests that the economic value of a ﬁshery is enhanced
when exclusive property rights are deﬁned and enforced to the resource. In
the United States the legal authority to create such rights has existed since
the passage of the Magnuson-Stevenson Fishery Management and Conser-
vation Act of 1976.1 Over the years property rights have been created to
some – but not most – U.S. ﬁsheries. If property rights are in fact critical to
the economic viability of ﬁsheries, why then, despite a legal framework de-
signed to ease their creation, are most ﬁsheries still lacking even rudimentary
property rights?
This questions’ breadth more easily elicits further questions rather than
answers. A full accounting of the determinants of property rights in ﬁsheries
will be constructed from the answers to many narrower questions. In this note
I investigate one such question: Are there important spatial and economic
characteristics of ﬁsheries managed under the Magnuson Act which aﬀect the
decision to establish property rights?
2 Literature Review
The general theory of property rights is well established (Barzel, 1989; Libecap,
1989). The creation of property rights is viewed as an economic decision be-
cause their design, monitoring, and enforcement consumes real resources.
This view allows for a rational reconstruction of the choice process using
marginal analysis (Anderson and Hill, 1974). Within the marginal frame-
work one can not, a priori, demonstrate the universal adoption of property
rights: The extent of property rights adoption will depend on the marginal
costs and beneﬁts. A core proposition of this literature holds that eﬀorts
to create property rights will, ceteris paribus, increase as either transaction
costs fall and/or the value of resources increase. Empirical investigations
lend support to this proposition (see Demsetz, 1967; Cheung, 1970; Field,
1989).
Several authors have incorporated these propositions into models of ﬁsh-
ery management. Anderson and Lee (1986) show that positive transaction
1In 1996 Congress passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act that included a provision for
a ﬁve–year moratorium on the implementation of individual transferable quotas. This
provision was allowed to expire in 2002.
1costs generate situations where ﬁshery managers “failing” to fully enforce
property rights may increase social welfare. Others have come to similar
conclusions (Milliman, 1986; Sutinen and Andersen, 1985; Anderson, 1989).
3 Institutional Background
The Magnuson Act extended U.S. jurisdiction over marine resources from 12
to 200 nautical miles. The Act authorizes three agencies to manage ﬁsheries
in this 200–mile zone. Eight quasi–independent regional ﬁshery management
councils representing commercial, recreational, and consumer ﬁshing interests
develop ﬁshery regulations that are presented to the Secretary of Commerce
in the form of Fishery Management Plans (FMPs). In turn, the Secretary
either approves or rejects each FMP. Much of this review process is delegated
to the National Marine Fishery Service, a sub–agency in the Department
of Commerce, that, along with the United States Coast Guard, enforces
regulations contained in each FMP. (For a detailed analysis of this Act and
the regulatory review process see Kincaid (1999)).
4 Construction of the Data Set
Drawing on data contained in these FMPs I developed a set of forty–ﬁve
ﬁsheries to serve as observations in my data set. My review of these plans re-
vealed the existence of two basic categories of property rights: Limited–entry
programs and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). In the sample, entry
is limited in twenty–one ﬁsheries. Sixteen ﬁsheries have permanent limited–
entry programs, of which four have ITQ programs in place. ITQs assign a
speciﬁc share of a ﬁsheries’ harvest (the ‘quota’) to individual ﬁshermen who,
in turn, may harvest this quota or transfer it to others. The remaining ﬁve
ﬁsheries have 5–year entry moratoriums.
Each program creates rents by limiting access to a resource that was
heretofore (essentially) open to all takers. However, under limited–entry
programs, these rents are unassigned and, in the absence of other regulations
(e.g. restrictions on vessel size), remain at risk because of the strong incentive
each ﬁsherman has to capture as large a share of the harvest as possible.
Thus, simple limited–entry programs run the risk of converting the problem
of the ﬁshery from one of too many ﬁshermen chasing too few ﬁsh, to one
2of a few ﬁshermen with too much gear chasing too few ﬁsh. Because ITQ
programs assign speciﬁc shares of the harvest to ﬁshermen, these perverse
incentives are dulled.
Notwithstanding these diﬀerences, each program confers some property
interest and so, for this analysis, I treat their presence as an indication of
property rights adoption. A binary variable, rights, summarizes this fact;
where zero indicates no property rights and one indicates some form of prop-
erty rights adoption. rights serves as the dependent variable in a probit
model of the determinants of property rights.
The adoption of property rights hinges on a standard cost–beneﬁt cal-
culation, where property rights are adopted if the net beneﬁt is positive.
The variable revenue, a three–year weighted average of ex–vessel revenue
(millions of 1995 dollars), proxies the beneﬁts of adoption.
Four variables proxy transaction costs. vessels, the number of ﬁshing
vessels in a ﬁshery, proxies exclusion costs (Cornes et al., 1986). ports,
an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 2, proxies land–based enforcement
costs; where zero indicates a ﬁshery with between 1 and 40 landing sites, one
indicates 41 to 80, and two indicates 81 or more sites. extent is an ordinal
variable that proxies at–sea enforcement costs. extent takes on the values
0, 1, and 2, and captures the geographical extent of a ﬁsheries range. Zero
denotes a ﬁshery with a ‘small’ range, one a ‘middling’ range, and two a ‘large’
range.2 Finally, part is an ordinal variable keyed to the type of ﬁshermen
found in a ﬁshery; a value of zero indicates a ﬁshery with mostly full–time
ﬁshermen, one a mix of full and part–time ﬁshermen, and two a ﬁshery with
mostly part–time ﬁshermen. part is motivated by the idea that ﬁsheries
prosecuted by full–time ﬁshermen are likely to be less susceptible to ‘hit–
and–run’ tactics, are likely to have more established norms of behavior, and
other attributes which tend to make a given amount of monitoring resources
more eﬀective (see Anderson, 1989; Wilen, 1979).
2This index is based on a location of ﬁshery. Fisheries found in a single management
council’s waters are set to 0, ﬁsheries found in multiple council waters, but remaining
within the EEZ are set to 1, and ﬁsheries entering international waters are set to 2.
3Table 1: Results of the Probit Estimation. The ﬁnal two columns present
the marginal eﬀects (calculated at the mean values of the all of the inde-
pendent variables) for each of the independent variables and their associated
asymptotic standard errors.
Variable Estimate S.E P–Value ME Asy. S.E.
(Intercept) 3.6221 1.1479 0.0016 — —
revenue 0.0347 0.0153 0.0236 0.0137 0.0062
vessel −0.0594 0.0310 0.0549 −0.0236 0.0124
extent −1.2379 0.6503 0.0570 −0.4907 0.2599
ports −1.4432 0.5437 0.0079 −0.5721 0.2167
part −0.9823 0.4627 0.0338 −0.3894 0.1809
5 Empirical Model and Results
The following equation is estimated using probit methods,
Prob(rights=1) = α0 + β1 ∗ revenue+
β2 ∗ vessels + β3 ∗ extent + β4 ∗ ports + β5 ∗ part (1)
This speciﬁcation allows for testing two hypotheses: Increases in revenue
should increase the probability of property rights adoption and increases in
transaction costs, as proxied by increases in vessels, ports, extent or
part, should decrease the probability of adoption.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the probit estimation. Both coeﬃcient
estimates and marginal eﬀects (calculated at the mean of the independent
variables) are presented. Overall the speciﬁcation performs well: 90% of
ﬁsheries not having property rights and 96% of those with property rights
are correctly classiﬁed. Each of the marginal eﬀects has the predicted sign:
transaction costs proxies enter with negative signs, while revenue enters
with a positive sign. All variables are statistically signiﬁcant with p–values
of 0.06 or less. A more important question turns on the empirical signiﬁcance
of the independent variables; that is to say, the magnitude of each variable’s
marginal eﬀect.
Changes in the variables signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability of adoption.
A one million dollar increase in revenue will increase the probability of
4Figure 1: CDFs for each value of ports as a function of revenue (panel
one) and vessels (panel two). Units of revenue are millions of 1995 dollars,
and hundreds of vessels.
5Table 2: Marginal Eﬀect of ports as a function of revenue (columns 2
and 3) and vessels (columns 5 and 6). The values of revenue and vessel
were generated by sorting the 45 observations and taking the means of three
groups of 15 observations each. ME01 is the marginal eﬀect of ports as it
shifts from 0 to 1, and ME12 is the marginal eﬀect of ports shifts from 1
to 2.
revenue ME01 ME12 vessels ME01 ME12
2.11 −0.49 −0.35 1.51 −0.12 −0.49
10.80 −0.42 −0.43 5.03 −0.17 −0.52
74.33 −0.01 −0.20 24.10 −0.47 −0.37
property rights adoption by 1.4%. An increase of 100 vessels decreases the
probability of adoption by 2.3%. As extent shifts from a lower category to
higher category the probability of adoption decreases by 49%, a similar shift
in ports decreases the probability of adoption by 21%, and likewise a shift
in part decreases probability of adoption by 39%.
Because the marginal eﬀects are non–linear functions of the data, a more
complete assessment of their magnitudes requires one to calculate their values
over a range of the other variable’s values (see Greene, 2002, for details.) For
example, the impact of ports may be quite diﬀerent in ﬁsheries with high
levels of revenue or vessels compared to those with low levels.
To consider this question I use the coeﬃcient estimates from the probit
model to calculate the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for each value
of ports as a function of various values of revenue, holding the other
variables at their means. I repeat these calculations using vessels instead
of revenue. This exercise results in six distinct cdfs that are displayed in
ﬁgure 1. Figure 1 is an example of a trellis graph (Cleveland, 1993; Ihaka
and Gentleman, 1996), where the left panel contains the estimated cdfs for
revenue and the right panel those for vessels. Each of the panel labels
presents information on the actual value of the respective cdf’s. ports has
a signiﬁcant aﬀect on the probability of property rights adoption, but the
magnitude of its eﬀect depends substantially on revenue and likewise on
vessels. Table 2 summarizes the marginal eﬀect of ports for three diﬀerent
values of revenue and vessels.
At low levels of revenue, changes in ports has a relatively large impact
6on the probability of property rights being adopted, however the impact of
ports diminishes substantially for high levels of revenue. The exception is
ME12, where even at high levels of revenue, there is a substantial impact on
property rights adoption.
The interplay between changes in the number of vessels and the number
of ports is a bit more complicated. ME01 is relatively small for ﬁsheries with
small numbers of vessels, however, as the number of vessels increases, the
magnitude of the marginal eﬀect increases substantially. ME12 is relatively
large for all values of vessels, suggesting that ﬁsheries with more than 80 ports
present particularly diﬃcult obstacles to property rights adoption. When one
considers that 42% of the ﬁsheries in my sample have more than 80 landing
sites, the impact of ports, and by extension, transaction costs, is likely to
be an important factor aﬀecting the probability of property rights adoption.
6 Conclusion
The passage of the Magnuson Act was heralded as a historic shift away from
traditional and ineﬃcient regulatory management of ﬁshery resources to a
system of management that would, on the one hand, enhance ﬁshermen’s
income by creating property rights to ﬁshery resources, and on the other,
preserve ﬁshery stocks though the stewardship that resource ownership af-
fords. The fact that, 27 years after the Act’s passage, only a small number of
ﬁsheries have some form of property rights deﬁned has lead to disappointment
in many quarters, and a search for answers to why traditional management
practices seem so entrenched.
The pattern of property rights adoption in U.S. marine ﬁsheries can be
largely explained by the variation in variables that describe important spatial
and economic characteristics of those ﬁsheries: Increases in the value of a
ﬁshery increases the probability of adoption, and increases in transaction
costs reduce the probability of adoption. The eﬀects of these variables are
consistent with the broader literature on property rights and transaction
costs, and suggest a partial explanation to the question of why so few ﬁsheries
are currently managed using exclusive property rights: Given the beneﬁts
that they would confer, the costs of deﬁning, monitoring and enforcing those
rights may be too high.
This should not, however, be viewed as a Panglossian statement that
ﬁsheries are managed in the best of all possible worlds. The net beneﬁts of
7property rights are a function not just of the characteristics of the ﬁshery, but
also of the institutional structure of ﬁshery management and the technology
of monitoring and enforcing property rights. Changes in either could lead to
the further adoption of property rights.
The fact that my sample is one of convenience justiﬁes a cautious ap-
praisal of my ﬁndings. Nonetheless, these ﬁndings indicate that eﬀorts to
more closely measure transaction costs and correlate these costs with the
incidence of property rights will be fruitful. This note is drawn from an on-
going project designed to model the adoption or non-adoption of ﬁve diﬀerent
forms of regulation in marine ﬁsheries. The results of such research should
provide useful information to policy makers as they reassess the history of
ﬁshery management since the passage of the Magnuson Act and seek to bet-
ter the economic standing of both ﬁshermen and the resources that sustain
them.
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